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ABSTRACT: Since the Eighties  populist parties have gained a growing electoral consensus in many coun-
tries. The current wave of populism, that can be called as “multifaceted populism”, is the third of three 
waves that occurred over the years. 
Building on Rokkan’s cleavage theory, the present study intends to argue that the three different waves 
were originated by the same cleavage. Such a cleavage is characterized by the opposition between the 
elite and the people, and by the opposition between a participatory conception of democracy and two 
other conceptions of democracy, namely the elitist and the constitutional ones.  
In other words, populism emerges to counteract the overly elitist or procedural traits that democracy can 
develop. But if, on the one hand, populism can help democracy to revitalize itself, on the other hand, it can 
promote a radical communitarian form of democracy, which is in contrast with the liberal system of checks 
and balances and may ultimately lead to an erosion of pluralism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Populism currently represents one of the most debated issues in the social and polit-
ical sciences. The scholarly production on populism is increasingly flourishing, and the 
research is opening to “new” areas and methods. Some interesting studies, for in-
stance, have focused on populism in world regions that until recently had never been 
taken into consideration: India (Subramanian, 2007) and Australia and New Zealand 
(Denemark and Bowler, 2002); others have taken into account the demand for popu-
lism, analysing populist attitudes and sentiments at the mass level (Oliver and Rahn, 
2016; Akkerman, Zaslove and Spruyt, 2017); and others have examined peculiar and 
overlooked aspects of the phenomenon, such as the link between populism and for-
eign policy (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015) or the relationship between populism and 
gender (de Lange and Mügge, 2015).   
The attention of the scholars has also often focused on the causes from which both 
the populist parties and, more generally, the phenomenon of populism are derived or 
of which they would take advantage. In this respect, recent studies have attempted to 
analyse the surge of populism that started in the late eighties and early nineties by us-
ing the concept of cleavage. Among these, one cannot avoid mentioning, given their 
importance, the studies carried out by Kriesi (2008; see also Kriesi and Pappas 2015), 
Bornschier (2008), and Inglehart and Norris (2016).  
The common starting point of these studies is Kriesi’s acknowledgement that the 
four classic cleavages can be reduced to two. Indeed, the first two cleavages that are 
linked to the national revolution – the centre/periphery and state/church cleavages – 
are essentially cultural divides that are dominated by religious issues; the latter two 
cleavages – the rural/urban and owner/worker cleavages – represent socio-economic 
class divisions (Kriesi, 1994). Furthermore, all the aforementioned authors agree that 
the meaning of these two dimensions – especially the cultural dimension – has been 
transformed over the years, particularly during two critical events or junctures: the cul-
tural revolution of the 1960s, and the processes of globalization and denationalization 
that occurred in the 1990s.  
Indeed, during the late 1960s, new conflicts – as those for instance between manag-
ers and socio-cultural professionals – and new social movements emerged. The latter, 
in addition to fostering the birth of new parties – the New Left and the Green Party – 
on the one hand strengthened the traditional class cleavage and on the other altered 
the meaning of the cultural dimension, thus weakening traditional moral and religious 
issues and emphasizing issues such as environmentalism, peace and gender equality. 
Bornschier (2008), in this regard, speaks about a rapid spread of universalistic values, 
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such as the principle of individual autonomy or the free choice of one’s lifestyle, and 
emphasizes that these values constitute the left-libertarian pole of a new cultural di-
mension of the conflict. Inglehart and Norris (2016), in turn, speak about the develop-
ment and proliferation of post-materialist values, such as cosmopolitanism and multi-
culturalism. 
In the nineties, the appearance of the immigration flows, the European integration 
project, and, moreover, the globalization processes transformed the meaning of the 
cultural dimension once again, emphasizing issues such as European integration and 
immigration; instead, the traditional class cleavage has evolved into a broader state-
market cleavage, and has undergone, in the course of time, a loss of salience.  
According to Kriesi, the process of globalization has triggered a new structural con-
flict, opposing the “winners” and “losers” of globalization. Kriesi has referred to this an-
tagonism as a conflict between integration and demarcation. In the economic dimen-
sion, therefore, a neoliberal, free trade position contrasts with a defensive, protection-
ist one; in the cultural dimension, a universalist and multiculturalist position is opposed 
to a position in favour of protecting national identity, culture and values.  
In particular, the lack of responsiveness of the established parties to the complaints 
of the globalization losers gives the populist right parties a chance to mobilize them. 
Indeed, the new challengers from the populist right tend to take the “losers’” side and 
to combine a position of economic integration (that is, in support of market integration 
and economic liberalization) with a position of cultural demarcation, which is seriously 
concerned by the threats to national identity caused by the European integration pro-
cess and, more generally, by the opening of borders (Kriesi et al., 2008). 
Bornschier, for his part, notes that during the nineties, the appearance of the global-
ization processes provided new chances of success to a neo-conservative counter-
movement that emerged, in the previous decade, in opposition to the universalistic 
values and the libertarian left and that emphasized the relevance of tradition, of the 
established community, and of the social bond; a new cultural conflict based on the 
opposition between libertarian-universalistic values and traditional-communitarian 
ones has therefore arisen. 
A remarkable part of the constituency, according to Bornschier, is placed on the tra-
ditional-communitarian pole; showing common worries regarding immigration flows, 
the loss of identity, and the erosion of the community, this constituency represents the 
potential that the populist right parties can mobilize. Indeed, these parties tend to 
adopt a “cultural-differentialist” discourse that rejects the idea of a multicultural socie-
ty and universalist values and stresses the people’s right to preserve the national cul-
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ture’s distinctive traditions as well as framing the issues of identity and community in 
terms of “us” and “they”.  
Finally, Inglehart and Norris (2016) observe how the “silent revolution” that oc-
curred in the late 1960s has triggered a counter-revolution among those who do not 
share the post-materialist values and remain instead anchored to traditional familiar 
rules: the oldest generations, white men, and the lesser educated. These people repre-
sent the political potentials that populist parties can mobilize. A new cultural cleavage 
that opposes populist values to liberal-cosmopolitan values has currently acquired 
greater salience, this prevailing on the other relevant structuring dimensions and shap-
ing the current political space. 
The studies just mentioned represent the unavoidable reference and starting point 
of this article, which mainly represents an attempt to apply cleavage theory to the 
analysis of populism. The article, which adopts a prevailing theoretical approach and is 
largely based on a critical review of the most recent literature, is organized as follows: 
in the second section, we will show how three different waves of populism – founda-
tional, consolidated or classic, and multifaceted – followed one another, and we will 
present our principal thesis, according to which there is a unique cleavage from which 
all the populist parties originate. Since the opposition between the people and the 
elite, which represents the root of what we can call the “populist cleavage”, is, accord-
ing to our account, strictly bound to the concept of people’s sovereignty, a description 
of the relationship between populism and democracy and of the possible strains that 
affect the current democracies will be then provided (section 3); subsequently, drawing 
on the cleavage theory of Rokkan and Lipset, the focus will be placed on an illustration 
of the main features both of the populist cleavage and of the populist waves and par-
ties that derive from it (section 4); the article will conclude with a presentation of the 
different outcomes that populism can lead to; in this respect, we use the expression 
“the two faces of populism” to indicate how populism can foster both a republican and 
a radical communitarian form of democracy (section 5).    
Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify that, despite the richness in its 
content, research on populism has always shown many difficulties in defining its privi-
leged object of study, thus giving rise to an endless debate on what populism actually 
is. This study does not claim to supply an ultimate and supposed “right” definition of 
populism, but we are aware of the need to clarify the approach that we intend to 
adopt in analysing the phenomenon under investigation. Indeed, as Rovira Kaltwasser 
et al. have recently highlighted (2017, 12), «part of the problem in the populism schol-
arship in political science (…) is not much the absence of sharp conceptualizations, but 
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rather the tendency of scholars to avoid specifying their own understanding of popu-
lism».     
Three main definitions or conceptual approaches of populism currently dominate 
the scholarly debate: the political-strategic approach, the socio-cultural approach, and 
the ideational approach (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017; see also Palano, 2017) – among 
the other perspectives, because of its interest, that of Anselmi (2018) must be quoted.  
In a very concise way, it can be stated that the first approach, which is mostly based 
on Weyland’s works (2001), considers populism as a strategy to win and maintain rul-
ing power based on individual, personalistic leaders who are supported by a large 
number of followers and on a direct, quasi-personal contact between a leader and his 
or her followers.  
According to the second approach, as proposed in particular by Ostiguy (2009; 
2017), populism can be defined on the basis of a high-low axis as the “flaunting of the 
‘low’”; it consists of a specific relationship between political leaders and their support-
ers that is characterized by folksy and coarse manners, tastes and ways of speaking; 
practices and repertoires that are inspired by cultural nativism; personalistic and un-
mediated models of authority and forms of leadership.  
The third approach is probably the most widespread in the field. Within this ap-
proach, it is possible to distinguish between two positions. 
 The first position shares many affinities with Ostiguy’s understanding and defines 
populism as a political or a political communication style and as a set of rhetorical pat-
terns (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt and Tormey, 2013). Populism, in other 
words, pertains to specific features of both the form and the content of discourses, ex-
pressive aspects and political performances involving simplicity and spontaneity, 
bluntness and coarseness, antagonism between friends and foes, and the appeal to the 
people as a source of legitimization. 
The second position is largely based on Mudde’s work; however, other scholars, 
such as Albertazzi and McDonnel (2008), share the same point of view. This position 
defines populism explicitly as an ideology. Populism can thus be defined as “an ideolo-
gy that considers society to be ultimately separated into two antagonistic groups, ‘the 
pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an ex-
pression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, 543).  
Being based on a small number of core concepts and not being able to provide ei-
ther a framework for “decoding” and “interpreting” the social world nor answers to the 
political requests that stem from civil society, populism constitutes a specific type of 
ideology: a thin-centred ideology. Accordingly, it shows an irrepressible tendency to 
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borrow concepts and ideas from other (thick or full) ideologies or even to be mixed 
with them. 
Clearly, each of the aforementioned approaches has merits and shortcomings. The 
main limitation of the ideological definition, for instance, is its own excessive minimal-
ism and thinness, which lead it to have too broad of an extension and to the possible 
inclusion of “false positives”; that is, to consider non-populist political parties as being 
populist. Although aware of this weakness, we are convinced that the ideological per-
spective can be extremely useful for tackling the specific object of this study – the rela-
tionships among populism, cleavages and democracy – and to demonstrate the thesis 
about the existence of a unique cleavage from which all populist parties originate and 
that therefore recurs unchanged over time. 
In both the political-strategic approach and the ideational-discursive approach, pop-
ulism is predominantly seen as something temporary and as linked to the achievement 
of the most varied objectives and having almost no reference to the content of such 
objectives. It would seem, accordingly, that a such point of view is not particularly con-
gruent with the purposes of this study; populism, in other words, is something more – 
and is more long-lasting – than just a political strategy or a style of communication.   
The focus on the personalistic leader and on his relationship with a social basis, 
which is typical of the socio-cultural approach as well as, more generally, other non-
ideological approaches appears in the same way as being not particularly fruitful in 
dealing with populism when trying to link it to the concept of cleavage. Furthermore, it 
must be taken into account that almost all leaders currently prefer to adopt direct 
forms of communication that bypass party mediation as an effect of political personali-
zation and mediatization processes. In this sense, it could be argued that the populist 
political style has become a sort of koiné for many leaders of the overall political spec-
trum. Therefore, as noted by Mudde, even if «charismatic leadership and direct com-
munication between the leader and “the people” are common among populists, these 
features facilitate rather than define populism» (Mudde, 2004, 545). 
Thence, in defining populism, we think that it might be more valuable to take into 
account the set of ideas that it promotes; i.e., to consider populism as an ideology. In 
this respect, it is important to bear in mind that any ideology has both a cognitive func-
tion and a pragmatic-social one; besides, no party or movement has ever defined itself 
as “populist”. 
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2. One cleavage, many cleavages? 
 
The phenomenon of populism has, as is known, a long history. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the case that some scholars have attempted to distinguish different 
phases within this history on the basis of geographical area or time period and/or on 
ideological features (Hermet, 2001; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Woods, 
2014). 
A historical analysis of the real forms of populism that have followed one another 
over time (that is, of the political parties and movements that are traditionally consid-
ered populist) shows how these forces alternate periods of prosperity with period of an 
almost total absence. On the basis of this analysis and trying to sharpen the previous 
classifications, it is possible to identify three different waves of populism; essentially, 
those that have recently been listed by Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (2017). 
The first wave, which occurred in the period from the middle to the end of the 19th 
century, was foundational populism (Hermet, 2001; 2013). Although there is no doubt 
that the word “populism” arose in Russia around 1870, doubt can be cast on whether 
the Russian Narodnik movement can be considered populist, as will be discussed be-
low, in contrast to what has been argued by many authors. This movement may at 
least be considered a precursor of populism1. This first wave includes, on the contrary, 
the agrarian populism of the American People’s Party and , accepting the suggestions 
of Hermet, the nationalist French Boulangism.    
The second wave extends approximately from 1930 to 1960 and represents consoli-
dated or classic populism. Spreading in many Latin American states through the politi-
cal action of leaders such as Péron and Vargas, this kind of populism no longer repre-
sented something negative or marginal but transformed itself into the State’s power 
and ideology (ivi; see also Taggart, 2000); however, some Latin American populist lead-
ers, such as Yrigoyen and Alessandri, had begun to make themselves heard already in 
the twenties. A different kind of populism emerged during this period in France: Pouja-
dism.    
The third wave started in the eighties and continues today and can be labelled the 
wave of multifaceted populism. Indeed, at least four different types of populism have 
come to the fore during this period: xenophobic populism, embodied by parties such as 
the Scandinavian Progress Parties, the French and the Belgian National Fronts, and the 
 
1 The same Hermet admits that «Although justifiable in chronological terms, this option was indeed unique 
in the sense that it inaugurated the use of the word “populism”, but applied it to a historical manifestation 
that was barely representative of the forms of expression that this phenomenon would later acquire» 
(Hermet, 2013, 84). 
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Austrian Freedom Party; the Latin American populism of Chávez and Morales, which 
was preceded by the neoliberal populism of leaders such as Collor de Mello, Fujimori 
and Menem; the progressive populism of some radical left parties such as the Spanish 
Podemos and the Greek Syriza; and the populism expressed by political parties which 
locate themselves outside the left-right dimension, such as the Italian Five Star Move-
ment.    
The studies mentioned in the first section, which have analysed the possible connec-
tions between the surge of populism and the cleavages, have focused only on the third 
wave, which occurred only over a specific period of time and only in the specific geo-
graphical area of Western Europe. Even if this kind of approach is undoubtedly correct, 
it leaves open a number of questions. What about the previous populist phenomena? 
And what about those of different geographical areas?  
One possible answer may be that neo-populism differs from previous forms of popu-
lism and therefore requires specific explanations. In this sense and referring once again 
to the cleavage approach, it may be speculated, in an incomprehensible way, that only 
the third wave originates from a cleavage. A possible alternative and a more convincing 
hypothesis is to suppose that the three waves of populism derive from three different 
cleavages (fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1 Three different cleavages for three different waves of populism 
 
Cleavage 1 1th Wave Cleavage 2 2nd Wave Cleavage 3 3rd Wave 
 
 
 
 
Pp1 
 
Pp2 
 
Ppn 
 Pp3 
 
Pp4 
 
Ppo 
 Pp5 
 
Pp6 
 
Ppp 
 
-                                                                             t                                                                           + 
 
Pp=Populist party 
 
This type of explanation, which focuses on the specific causes of populism within 
each individual state or within different time spans, risks considering every simple so-
cial conflict as a cleavage; indeed, as will be better seen later, to be considered as such, 
a cleavage must embody the toughest and most lasting of social conflicts. Accordingly, 
this explanation risks multiplying the number of cleavages, especially if one aims to 
take into account not only the populist parties; that is, to analyse the entire political 
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party spectrum. Is it indeed possible that even non-populist parties are in turn gener-
ated by other cleavages? Moreover, it is impossible to identify some origins that the 
third waves might have in common.    
In opposition to this answer, another thesis could be expressed: that there is a 
unique cleavage from which all the populist parties originate. This cleavage is not con-
stantly active; that is, it is able to produce its effects only under certain circumstances, 
when certain critical junctures occur. The manifestations of this cleavage differ in time 
and space; hence, populist parties with opposite features can emerge from it (fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2 The populist cleavage and the three waves of populism 
 
  Pp1       Pp2       Ppn Pp3       Pp4       Ppo       Pp5       Pp6      Ppp 
       
          1st Wave        2nd Wave         3d wave 
                   McJ                                       McJ                                          McJ 
Cleavage 
      
  -                                                               t                                                                + 
 
Pp=Populist party; McJ=Macro critical juncture 
 
This different type of explanation does not exclude the intervention of specific na-
tional causes or a snowball effect because a populist party in a given country can in-
duce the birth of similar parties in other countries.  
To demonstrate this thesis, this study will first attempt to shed light on the features 
of the structural division that produces populist parties; then, it will try to show why 
this division can be considered a cleavage. Finally, it will try to demonstrate how this 
same cleavage recurs unchanged over time and how it reactivated itself under certain 
circumstances in the course of the three different populist waves.   
 
 
3. Populism and democracy 
 
As previously argued, the concept of populism is based on two specific drivers: the 
opposition between the (pure) people and the (corrupt) elite and the demand that pol-
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itics constitutes the expression of the people’s general will. This means that the thin-
centred ideology of populism and populist parties emerge only when the following 
conditions are met: the people acquire a pivotal role in the political arena and the elite 
rules with no reference to the people such that a division between the people and the 
elite must therefore occur. Both of these conditions are strictly bound to the idea of 
the people’s sovereignty and to the consequent development of democracy, as this 
study will attempt to demonstrate. As, indeed, Anselmi supports in one of his latest 
books, «Populism today is, to all intents and purposes, a highly probable option of de-
mocracy (…) populism must be considered as a complex phenomenon deeply connect-
ed with democracy (…). Populism is a modality of social expression of popular sover-
eignty» (Anselmi, 2018, 1-2).   
Regarding the first condition, it is remembered that the people became a relevant 
political actor during the course of the glorious English revolution – in an imperfect and 
incomplete way –, of the American revolution – in a triumphant but doubtful way –, 
and of the French revolution – in a radical but chaotic and inconsistent way (Mény and 
Surel, 2000). As Barrington Moore observed many years ago, these revolutionary epi-
sodes have to be included among the factors that triggered the democratization pro-
cess; the first because it helped to limit royal absolutism and the others because they 
helped to curb, in different ways, the power of a rural aristocracy that hindered the 
achievement of the democratic political system (Moore, 1966).  
Indeed – and here we come to the second condition –, the debate on the actual role 
of the people arose as soon as democracy began to consolidate; that is, when the prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty was broadly accepted. The awareness of the distance be-
tween the real and the ideal democracy as well as the awareness of the existence of 
different conceptions of democracy brought out a set of questions regarding the exer-
cise of power by the people, the relationship between the citizens and their elected 
representatives in Parliament, and the institutions called upon to express the people’s 
will (Mény and Surel, 2000). However, it must be clarified that the requests for a 
broader participation of the people in political life can arise not only in democratic 
states but also in autocratic regimes.       
Generally, three main distinct concepts and practices of democracy can be distin-
guished: elitist, constitutional, and participatory2. In conceiving democracy as a method 
 
2 These three different concepts derive from three general views of politics showing opposite characteris-
tics: elitism, pluralism and, certainly, populism. Elitism argues, in the same way of populism, that society is 
divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the people and the elite. But, differently, it con-
siders the elite as virtuous, gifted, and endowed with the highest qualities, while the people are consid-
ered ignorant, coarse, and inferior both from a moral and intellectual point of view. Pluralism, on the con-
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through which individuals acquire the power of decision by means of a competitive 
struggle for the popular vote, the first approach takes inspiration from Shumpeter’s 
works; citizens’ participation in democratic life would be exercised only during elec-
tions, and politics should continue to be an elite affair. The second perspective consid-
ers as democratic that form of government that is characterized by a plurality of cen-
tres of power, none of which prevails over the others; a strong separation of powers 
and the development of a set of checks and balances are deemed necessary conditions 
for enhancing the quality of democracy. In contrast with the aforementioned concep-
tions of democracy, the latter is based on the active, strong, and continuous participa-
tion of the citizens in decision-making processes; the institutions of the referendum, 
the recall election, the citizens’ initiative, and majority rule are firmly fostered; politics 
should consist in the immediate expression of the general will of the people (Abts and 
Rummens, 2007). 
This last form of democracy shows two different faces: the republican and the com-
munitarian. The first conceives political participation as a duty of the citizens; this con-
sists in incessant deliberations on relevant issues, especially those concerning the 
common good, taken within the existing rules. The second is actually a family of con-
ceptions. Generally, it considers participation as the main right of the citizens, who are 
given the ability to control the rules and to decide upon them. It also emphasizes the 
relevance of the inclusion of all the members of the social community into the political 
community; in this way, participation is seen as a tool through which the common good 
is defined, or even as the same common good. Moreover, participation is often 
deemed more important than the maintenance of the main representative institutions 
(Eisenstadt, 1999). 
This second conception is not internally consistent. On the one hand, it promotes 
participation at every level of social life and accordingly sympathizes with associations; 
on the other, in supporting a direct and non-mediated form of participation, it some-
times looks with suspicion at the formal features of these associations, conceiving 
them as no more than representatives of specific interests. In a radical approach, this 
conception reaches as far as to not giving any value to the representative institutions 
(ibidem).         
Ultimately, a strain among different ideas and practices of democracy has affected 
Western countries since the democratic revolutions and has subsequently spread to 
those countries where democratic ideals have seeped in. The aforementioned three 
 
trary, does not share such a dichotomous and Manichean perspective; indeed, it maintains that society is 
cross-cut by a plurality of groups with different ideas, values, and interests (Mudde, 2004; Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). 
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main different forms of democracy are therefore in friction one with each other; that 
is, any imbalance towards one and its radicalization induces the appearance of oppo-
site forces that tend to rebalance the situation. Populism, in other words, arises when 
the gap between the people and the governing leaders has become too wide, when the 
political establishment merely complies with formal rules and procedures, and when 
the general will of the people is not taken into account as much as it deserves to be 
(Canovan, 1981; Mény and Surel, 2000; Taguieff, 2002).    
To this extent, a relevant question arises spontaneously: do the opposition between 
the people and the elite and the related strain among the different ideas and practices 
of democracy really represent a cleavage? 
 
 
4. The populist cleavage 
 
According to Rokkan and Lipset (1967; 1985), cleavages represent the main opposi-
tions within national communities that stem from the multiplicity of conflicts rooted in 
the social structure. In other words, only some conflicts, that are the strongest, those 
that endure over time despite having lost their original salience, and those capable of 
polarizing politics constitute cleavages.   
These permanent, often latent, oppositions between different homogeneous social 
groups usually break out when certain critical junctures – that is, times of radical 
change – arise. A juncture, indeed, represents a watershed between new and older 
forms of both society and political community.  
Finally, cleavages cause the birth of specific political parties and specific party sys-
tems as well as a long-term alignment between the opposed social groups and those 
parties. This means that the social conflicts that these cleavages express must be politi-
cized, which occurs when the opposed social groups gain a collective identity and when 
these identities are politically organized. 
Following Bartolini and Mair (1990), it has been therefore stated that to constitute a 
cleavage, a political divide must include three elements: 
- a socio-structural element: a class, religious belief, ethnic group, etc.; 
- an element of collective identity of this social group; 
- an organizational manifestation in the form of collective action or an enduring 
organization of the involved social groups. 
These components, as will be shown shortly on the basis of a brief analytical exami-
nation of the three waves of populism, also seem to characterize the “populist” politi-
cal divide, which can therefore be considered in all respects a cleavage. 
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First, this divide includes a socio-structural element, represented by the people, that 
is formed in general terms by all people who are not part of the elite; more precisely, 
the people can be intended in two main distinct ways: as demos, being identified with 
the common men and with those who live at the bottom, or as ethnos, being identified 
with the nation3. It should be noted that a division between the people and the elite 
characterizes any social system and that this division can be exacerbated by the ap-
pearance of certain critical junctures.  
All this involves the appearance of great differences both from a socio-economic 
viewpoint – different lifestyles, levels of income, and opportunities – and, above all, 
from a political viewpoint – different levels of power, different possibilities to partici-
pate in the decision-making process, and different privileges.      
Those who are not part of the elite soon become aware of both the increasingly 
great distance that separates them from the elite – this latter is seen as an otherness 
not comparable to themselves, as something totally alien – and their sharing amongst 
themselves the same living conditions and worries; accordingly, they develop a sense 
of belonging towards the people, a collective identity. This happens when the populist 
line of division overcomes the other lines of division, such as those based on gender, 
social class or education, making these latter aspects almost completely ineffective.  
Clearly, the elites are largely responsible for the development of this collective iden-
tity when they mainly behave and act without considering the needs of the people.   
Finally, the organizational manifestation in the form of collective action also does 
not take long to manifest itself; the social conflicts expressed by the “populist” political 
divide are indeed soon politicized, and populist parties or movements with different 
features – radical rightists, radical leftists, ethno-regionalists, etc. – do emerge in the 
political scenario. Occasionally, some political entrepreneurs take advantage of the 
people’s malaise and malcontent; uttering promises that are in actuality almost impos-
sible to achieve, they try to acquire broader visibility and to obtain better personal 
electoral results.  
As stated above, it can be argued that the populist cleavage is not continually active 
and that it manifests itself only with the appearance of macro critical junctures – those 
that demarcate the birth of the three waves –, in addition to which micro critical junc-
tures are also often present. When the populist cleavage is active, the other lines of di-
vision and conflict lose their relevance; furthermore, the meaning of the “people” 
changes from wave to wave. 
 
3 Taggart notes that the populist rhetoric considers “the people” as the occupants of the heartland, i.e., a 
territory of the imagination, embodying the positive aspects of everyday life, where a virtuous and unified 
population resides (Taggart, 2000).      
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Table 1 summarizes the entire process that gives birth to populist parties throughout 
the three different waves, showing which macro and micro critical junctures activate 
the populist cleavage and clarifying the different meanings given to the concept of 
“people” from time to time. 
 
Table 1 - Waves, critical junctures and populist parties 
Waves Macro critical 
junctures 
Micro critical 
junctures 
Cleavage Meaning of 
“People” 
Parties or 
movements 
1st: middle-
end XIX cen-
tury  
2nd Industrial 
Revolution and 
development of 
Capitalism 
- End of the 
American Civil 
War 
People vs. Elite 
- Who struggle 
daily by doing a 
manual job 
- People’s 
Party (Usa) 
- Defeat of the 
Paris Commune 
- Economic re-
cession 
- Political cor-
ruption 
- Nation - Boulangism 
(Fra) 
2nd: 1930-60 Collapse of the 
Wall Street 
stock exchange; 
End of the 2nd 
world war 
 
- Relevant role 
of the army 
- Rise of the 
State of Rio 
Grande do Sul 
(Bra) 
- Demos - Peronism 
(Arg) 
- Estado Novo 
(Bra) 
3rd: 1980- Globalisation; 
economic crisis 
- EU integration - Ethnos - Populist rad-
ical right par-
ties (Fn; Fpö) 
- Collapse of 
the communist 
block 
- End of North 
American “anti-
socialist” poli-
cies 
- Demos - Chavism 
(Ven) 
- Mas (Mo-
rales; Bol) 
 
- Collapse of 
the communist 
block 
- EU integration 
- Austerity 
measures 
-Globalisation’s 
losers 
- Populist rad-
ical left par-
ties (Syriza; 
Podemos) 
- EU integration 
- Political cor-
ruption 
- Common 
people 
- Fsm (Ita) 
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The first macro critical juncture is represented by the IInd industrial revolution and by 
the development of capitalism, whose main features were the technological progress 
and the overwhelming development of communications, European emigration towards 
the Americas, and the birth of the oil industry, of trusts and cartels, and of large bank-
ing concentrations – a set of elements that caused deep contradictions and imbalanc-
es. 
In the United States, a micro juncture was also added: the end of the civil war. The 
American farmers soon became aware that the end of the war had not given them any 
material advantage and that, on the contrary, a plutocratic elite was born from it; 
moreover, a collective identity began to develop. On the one hand, there were the 
“people”, comprising those who struggled daily doing a manual job: the craftsmen, the 
small traders and entrepreneurs, and the farmers; on the other hand, there were the 
elite, who were enriched in a parasitic and immoral way. These conflicts were first po-
liticized by some farmer’s organizations and alliances and later by the People’s Party, 
founded in 1892 (Kazin, 1998). 
In France, the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871, the economic crisis caused by 
the international competition, and scandals involving many officials constituted the 
roots on which the movement of Boulangism arose. Born from a political-
parliamentary strategy orchestrated by the left, which was led by Clemenceau, the 
movement gained a large echo among the urban masses. The latter began to consider 
themselves completely different, from both a material and a moral point of view, from 
their representatives, who were deemed powerless oligarchs, and from the financiers, 
the capitalists and the politicians. Claiming that sovereignty lies in the people and con-
sidering Boulangism as the “party of the people and for the people”, the charismatic 
general Boulanger had the intention of replacing the parliamentary regime with a 
strong presidential system (Hermet, 2013).   
As stated before, is not completely correct to consider the Russian Narodniks a pop-
ulist movement – if anything, they expressed a form of proto-populism – because of 
the low number of adherents (only a couple of dozen) and because of the almost total 
absence of both a popular participation and a people’s collective identity. Indeed, the 
movement was formed by a small group of romantic and utopian intellectuals of the 
urban middle class, which considered the peasantry biologically and morally more 
healthy, and therefore proposed to “go to the people”.    
The second macro critical juncture is formed by two events: the collapse of the Wall 
Street stock market in October 1929 and the end of the Second World War. In Latin 
America, the collapse of the stock exchange caused a fall in the prices of exported raw 
materials and a crisis of the liberal age’s oligarchic regimes, which were based on the 
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primary sector export economic model; these regimes were not able to satisfy the 
growing demands of democratization – triggered by the victory of the Allies – coming 
from the humbler strata of the population. As a result, authoritarian forms of govern-
ment prevailed in certain states, such as Peru and Bolivia, whereas populist ones pre-
vailed in others, such as Argentina and Brazil.   
The Latin American populist leaders – Péron and Vargas – were able to mobilize dif-
ferent popular constituencies and to foster a change in the relationship between the 
State and civil society, embodying social groups that had not been included in the polit-
ical community until then: the descamisados, indigenous tribal peoples, and others. In 
their discourse, the main distinction between the people and the elite was of socio-
economic status; the people were intended as demos and were indeed identified with 
those who live at the bottom and with the exploited working class. The elite, on the 
contrary, comprised, according to them, the local oligarchy, the foreign investors, and 
their political representatives (cfr. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). 
The third macro critical juncture is represented by globalization and includes the 
broad immigration flows and the economic crisis that broke out in 2008. Many com-
ments have been previously made on this juncture, as seen by analysing the works of 
Kriesi, Bornschier, and Inglehart and Norris.  
The first type of populism generated by this juncture was nationalist populism. Being 
identified with the nation, the people are here intended as ethnos; the elites are per-
ceived as agents of a foreign power, even if not as aliens per se, bowing down to cos-
mopolitanism and globalism; moreover, specific groups of others (as, for instance, eth-
nic minorities, immigrants, or undeserving beneficiaries of the welfare state) become 
the scapegoats of the people’s difficult living conditions (Mudde, 2007; Ruzza, 2017). 
The second type of populism was the Latin American neo-populism, which has simi-
lar characteristics to the populism that spread in the same area approximately fifty 
years earlier, seeking to mobilize the marginal popular classes and to achieve their so-
cial and political inclusion.   
The third type of populism is embodied by some radical left parties and therefore 
represents a progressive form of populism. As pinpointed by March (2011), these polit-
ical parties are populist in juxtaposing the “moral people” against the “corrupt elite” 
and in aiming to become the vox populi rather than the vanguard of the proletariat. 
The people are intended here to represent the totality of globalization losers; thus, 
these parties strive to defend against economic insecurity. Moreover, the populist radi-
cal left parties consider the EU as a vanguard of globalization and criticize it for its sup-
port of free-market integration at the expense of state-led regulation.   
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Finally, the fourth type of populism is characterized by how it locates itself outside 
the classical political right-left axis. The Five Stars Movement probably represents one 
of the best paradigmatic examples of this form of populism. Founded by the comedian 
Grillo in 2009, the movement has acquired growing consensus in a short period. Due to 
the incessant scandals regarding political corruption and, above all, to the privileges of 
an immovable “caste” of politicians – both on the left and on the right of the political 
spectrum –, most of the citizens came to share a common identity based on the elite-
people dichotomy. The people are interpreted by the movement in two different ways: 
as the common men, as those who experience the difficulties of everyday life; or as the 
people of the web, since the movement resorts broadly to online forms of communica-
tion and political action4. 
 
 
5. The two faces of populism 
 
We have previously tried to show how, since the democratic revolutions, Western 
countries have been pervaded by strains among different ideas and practices of de-
mocracy – namely, the elitist, constitutional, and participatory conceptions. We have 
also highlighted how, according to many authors, with whom we agree, populism tends 
to emerge when the people’s participation in the decision-making processes has been 
restricted, when democracy has sharpened and radicalized its elitist traits, or when a 
merely formal and procedural conception of democracy has been achieved. In opposi-
tion to these conceptions of democracy, populism would consider the participatory 
form of democracy as the best.  
Based on this conclusions, we consider worthwhile to take into account the possible 
effects that populism may have on the democratic form of government. In this respect, 
we have to bear in mind that participatory democracy, as we have previously noted, 
thereby reconnecting with Eisenstadt’s suggestions (1999), has two types, the republi-
can and the communitarian, and the latter can in turn assume both moderate and radi-
cal forms. Regarding the former, participation can reach decisions about the common 
good by having regard for existing rules, whereas for the latter, participation can come 
to represent the same common good and to overcome the representative institutions. 
These two different forms of participatory democracy vie with one another continually, 
thus pulling populism in opposite directions; the latter can also have two faces.  
 
4 Regarding Italian populism, see Biorcio (2015) and Tarchi (2015). 
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Indeed, in supporting a republican or a moderate communitarian version of democ-
racy, populism may come to represent a sort of antidote that helps democracy to revi-
talize itself, fostering the appropriate measures to enhance the people’s political par-
ticipation and to reduce the gap between the people and the elite: the institutions of 
the referendum, the recall election, etc.; populism is, therefore, essentially pro-
systemic because it does not strive to go beyond the democratic form of government; 
rather, it may lead, as has been emphasized by many authors (Canovan 1981; Arditi, 
2003), to a sort of hyper or radical democratism. 
However, some integral features – both defining and facilitating – of populism as 
well as the specific characteristics of the ideologies with which populism merges itself 
may push it towards the radical communitarian version of democracy and towards an 
anti-liberal, sometimes also anti-systemic, configuration. The political conflict, indeed, 
may come to focus on the different conceptions both of the constitution and of the na-
tional political system’s organization; the democratic system of decision-making and 
control may come to be at stake, and the populist political forces may finally imple-
ment authoritarian forms of government on behalf of the nation as a whole. 
The monolithic conception of the people as a homogeneous unity, for instance, may 
imply not only, as previously highlighted, the marginalization of specific groups but also 
the rejection of the opinions of those who disagree with the majority; this entails, ac-
cordingly, the erosion of pluralism and deliberation. Furthermore, conceiving that ver-
batim the “peoples’ government” means, as highlighted by many scholars including 
Kriesi (2015), to discard the liberal system of checks and balances.      
Moreover, perceiving the people as a homogeneous entity entails that the people’s 
will can be considered as something of a transparent nature, immediately accessible to 
charismatic leaders who aim to hear the people’s voice. These latter are usually outsid-
ers who are able to embody the people’s demands; they have a direct, unmediated 
ability to discern the complaints of the people and to act as spokespersons of the peo-
ple’s voice. Most of the time, these leaders tend to overcome the political parties’ role 
– as that of other organizations or agencies – and to reduce their power; indeed, in 
their opinion, the parties bring about artificial divisions within the homogeneous peo-
ple and corrupt the bond between the leaders and the supporters. It is not by chance 
that the populist parties are usually personal parties, meaning that the charismatic 
leader dominates his party, that the length of the party life depends on the length of 
the leader’s political life, and that the political communication is focused on the leader 
(Mudde, 2004; Abts and Rummens, 2007; Kriesi, 2015). 
Finally, when the thin-centred ideology of populism merges with ethno-nationalism, 
it suddenly acquires authoritarian traits, and anti-immigrant xenophobia prevails in the 
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anti-elitist discourse; accordingly, the democratization requests become secondary, if 
not even decorative, whereas the appeal to defend the group identity obtains greater 
relevance (Taguieff, 2002). 
If we look at the three populist waves, we can note how some populist parties or ex-
periences have tended to realize a republican or, at least, a moderate communitarian 
form of democracy, whereas others have been more in favour of the radical communi-
tarian version, regardless of which wave these parties belong to.    
The People’s Party, for instance, represents the perfect example of a protest move-
ment that tried to enhance the functioning of democracy. Indeed, as highlighted by 
Hermet (2013), it did not question the core values of American democracy and the 
Constitution; the party was substantially reformist because it aimed to stifle the abuses 
committed by the political elite and powerful businessmen. In addition, it strived to 
gain power through electoral means and did not intend to overthrow existing institu-
tions. 
Just over a century later, the Five Star movement was also founded with the goal of 
restoring the normal functioning of Italian democracy. For instance, in the course of 
the final meeting of the 2013 electoral campaign, Grillo declared the intention to fur-
ther a «democratic and non-violent revolution that raises the powers and overthrows 
the pyramids. The citizen becomes the State and enters Parliament». Moreover, the 
protest collective action of V-Day organized by Grillo a few years before had promoted 
three law initiatives: prohibiting convicts from being candidates for Parliament; estab-
lishing a maximum of two legislatures for the members of Parliament; and introducing 
direct preference in the political elections.    
Let us now consider the parties and experiences that followed a different path from 
that just described, fostering a radical communitarian form of democracy and some-
times coming to establish authoritarian forms of government. 
For instance, the deep ambiguities of populism are certainly well exemplified by 
Boulangism. Indeed, although «the nationalist orientation of Boulangism revealed, 
without a doubt, an authoritarian and militaristic approach, it nonetheless pursued a 
heterodox democratic project» (Hermet, 2013, 96). Actually, the project of Boulangism 
was to modify the 1875 Constitution, to overthrow the parliamentary system, and to 
implement a unifying plebiscitary and Caesaristic form of democracy based on the sov-
ereignty of the people embodied by a leader and on the binding mandate.     
In a different geographical and temporal context, the Latin American consolidated 
populism also arrived at results that are in some ways at odds with the republican par-
ticipatory democracy. As has well pinpointed by Zanatta (2017), this kind of populism 
represented an anti-liberal reaction that drew on the organicist and corporatist tradi-
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tion that spread in the region through the colonial expansion of the Christian empires 
of Spain and Portugal5. Due to deep social inequalities based on both economic and 
ethnic differences, the groups of people that fostered social and political inclusion con-
sidered liberal democracy as strange and hostile; on the contrary, these groups were in 
most cases in favour of the archaic communitarian democracy that was invoked by the 
populist leaders, intolerant towards the mediations and the institutions of representa-
tive democracy, and striving to unify the people against its internal and external ene-
mies. 
Therefore, according to the Latin American populist forces of the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, an authoritarian but popular regime devoted to “social justice” seemed to be the 
most authentic form of democracy. 
Finally, looking at the Europe of the eighties and nineties, it is possible to observe 
that the conception of democracy promoted by the populist radical right parties was 
also at odds with liberal democracy. In an empirical study, Mudde (2007) maintains 
that although these parties are not antidemocratic in a procedural sense, they oppose 
some fundamental values of liberal democracy, most notably, political pluralism and 
the constitutional protection of minorities. Indeed, in interpreting societies as homo-
geneous collectives, the radical right populist discourse promotes a monist and com-
munitarian version of democracy that is most strongly expressed in its nativism (mono-
culturalism or ethnocracy), authoritarianism (pushing the limits of the rule of law in fa-
vour of a state of security), and populism (the “general will” of the people cannot be 
limited by anything). Therefore, the preference of populist radical right parties is to-
wards an ethnocratic regime with strong authoritarian and plebiscitary elements. Con-
sequently, as stated by Mudde (2007, 156), «the more liberal a democracy is, the more 
antisystem the populist radical right will be. Similarly, we can posit that the more eth-
nic and plebiscitary a democracy, the more pro-system the populist radical right». 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The Latin American societies of that time were corporatist societies in the sense that individual rights and 
duties depended on the social groups that individuals belonged to. Those societies were also organicist 
and were conceived as a reflection of a revealed divine order: individuals were subordinated to the whole 
society, and the latter had a hierarchical conformation (Zanatta, 2017). 
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